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I. INTRODUCTION
As a general matter, most academics and criminal law experts are
of the view that mandatory minimum sentences are undesirable. The
arguments advanced against mandatory minimum sentences include: (1)
the undesirable narrowing of relatively transparent judicial discretion in
sentencing, inevitably replaced by an undesirable broadening of less
accountable prosecutorial and police discretion;' and (2) concerns that an
accused may plead guilty to a lesser offence in order to avoid the possibility
of a mandatory minimum sentence. Another argument is that mandatory
minimum sentences may violate an accused's rights under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.!
This article contributes to the debate on mandatory minimum
sentences by analyzing them in the context of the corporation as criminal'
and by employing a law and economics methodology.
In my view, it is difficult to advance the argument that mandatory
minimum sentences are undesirable when criminal acts are committed by
corporations.4
This article is divided into six parts. Part II sets out the policy
choices for controlling corporate misconduct and compares the utility of
the civil justice system through contract and tort law to the public
enforcement system through criminal law and regulatory statutes. Part III
describes how criminal law doctrine has been modified to allow
corporations, which are statutory creations, to be convicted of criminal
offences. Part IV analyses optimal sentencing policy for the criminal
corporation and evaluates whether the arguments made against mandatory
minimum sentences for individuals apply with equal force to corporations.
H. Dumont, "Disarming Canadians, and Arming Them with Tolerance: Banning Firearms and
Minimum Sentences to Control Violent Crime. Essay on an Apparent Contradiction" (2001) 39
Osgoode Hall L.J. 329.
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charterl.
3 This article does not engage with the debate on the efficacy of making corporations criminally
responsible in addition to or instead of the individuals (such as directors, officers, managers, and
employees) who may be involved in the wrongdoing. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the issue of
whether criminal corporations should be subject to mandatory minimum fines. However, many of the
arguments advanced in this article are applicable to the sentencing of individuals who commit white.
collar and economic crimes.
4 In this article, the term "criminal corporation" includes corporations convicted of both criminal
mens rea offences and quasi-criminal regulatory offences. The distinction between the two types of
statutory offences is discussed infra notes 9 to 12 and accompanying text.
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Part V surveys the Criminal Code' and selected regulatory statutes for
existing sentences for corporate misconduct, concluding that there is much
room for increasing existing sentences to bring them closer to optimal
levels.6 Part VI concludes.
II. POLICY CHOICES FOR CONTROLLING CORPORATE
MISCONDUCT
Corporations engage in activities that cause harm to third parties
but we can attempt to control corporate misconduct through a spectrum of
policy options. Public enforcement is available through the criminal justice
system and/or regulatory agencies, while private enforcement is available
through the civil justice system via tort and contract law remedies. Despite
providing compensation to the injured and some level of deterrence,
private enforcement mechanisms through tort and contract liability are not
suitable in redressing all types of corporate wrongdoing. In particular,
private enforcement is insufficient to control corporate misconduct when
those harmed are unable to detect the harm, when the harm to each
individual is relatively small, or when the individuals do not have the
financial means to bring a private suit.7 Additionally, private enforcement
may provide insufficient deterrence when corporations can purchase
insurance against private damage awards. On the other hand, insurance is
generally unavailable for fines resulting from criminal convictions. Private
enforcement through the civil justice system is also inadequate and public
enforcement more appropriate when society wants to express its collective
values and rules.'
5 R.S.C. 19S5, c. C-46.
6 This article focuses on statutes and offences that regulate economic activity and that result in
economic injury to victims. It does not focus on misconduct by corporations that results in F2rznal
injuryor death to victims. However, the distinction betveen the tw-o t)pesof misconduct isnot clear-cut
because the physical harm caused by certain types of criminal misconduct can generally b: quantified.
As a result, the arguments advanced in this paper are also generally apphcable to this later 6ub-group
of corporate misconduct.
7 However, class action legislation has impro% ed the ability of %ictims of corporate miscvonduct to
bring a private suit. The availabilityof contingency fees and other inno- ations in legal fee arrangements
has also improved the ability of those injured to bring suit. See generally P. Pun, "Financing Litigation
by Third-Party Investors: A Share of Justice?" (1993) 36 Os.gocde Hall LJ, 515.
Private enforcement may also be insufficient r:hen the corporate wrongdocr did not just
inadvertently cause the harm, but rather intended to cause harm. Whle punite damages could b-
awarded in addition to compensatory damages to address this issue, pumntie damages are estremely
uncommon in Canadian tort law, and if granted, %; ould hate to be estremely large to hawe any impact
2001]
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Public enforcement mechanisms involve state detection,
prosecution, and punishment of wrongdoers. A key public enforcement tool
available to control corporate crime is labelling, as a criminal or regulatory
offence, the misconduct of corporations. The choice between labelling
misconduct as a 'criminal' as opposed to a quasi-criminal 'regulatory'
offence is controversial. Labelling misconduct as 'criminal' attaches to the
offence a greater stigma than labelling it as a 'regulatory' offence. It sends
a symbolic message to the wrongdoer, other potential wrongdoers, and
society at large that the misconduct is most egregious. Labelling corporate
misconduct as 'regulatory' suggests that the conduct results from an
undesirable malfunction in an otherwise well-functioning market.9
In Canada, harmful corporate conduct that is addressed through
public enforcement mechanisms is increasingly labelled as regulatory. "
Most corporate wrongdoing is not prohibited by the Criminal Code, but
rather by various regulatory statutes such as the Competition Act,"
provincial securities acts, the federal and provincial corporate law statutes,
the Income Tax Act,'2 occupational health and safety legislation, and
environmental protection statutes.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF DOCTRINAL CORPORATE AND
CRIMINAL LAW: PROVING ELEMENTS OF THE
OFFENCE
Where corporate law intersects with criminal law there is a collision
between two well-established sets of principles, policies, and doctrines. On
the one hand, the corporation is a legal fiction. 3 It is a creature of statute.
on the corporation.
9 Laureen Snider has noted that"... formerly criminal activities have been completely deregulated,
had their legal sanctions removed and are neither mala in se (inherently wrong) nor tnala prohibita
(wrong according to social convention). Ideologically, corporate executives whose negligence or greed
leads to fraud, injury or death are not presented in the media or seen in popular culture as 'criminals."'
See L. Snider, "Abusing Corporate Power: The Death of a Concept" in S.C. Boyd, D.E. Chunn & R.
Menzies, eds., [Ab]Using Power: The Canadian Experience (Halifax: Fernwood, 2001) 112 at 112.
0 Ibid at 113.
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.
12 R.S.C. 1985 (5'b Supp.), c. 1.
13 Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "corporation" as "[ain artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law; an association of persons to whom the sovereign has offered
a franchise to become an artificial juridical person, with a name of its own, under which they can act and
contract and sue and be sued .... " See W.S. Anderson, ed., Ballentine's Law Dictionary with
614
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It acts only through its agents, directors, managers, and other employees.
Criminal law, however, requires an actus rets, a guilty act, and mens rea, a
guilty mind, for successful conviction of an offence. Thus, how can the state
charge a corporation -with a criminal offence when that corporation cannot
act or think on its own? 4
Traditional criminal law principles that have applied to individuals
have been modified to accommodate corporations charged with criminal
offences. The doctrine of respondeat superior, literally meaning, "let the
master answer," was developed by some courts in the United States to
address the issue."t This doctrine requires a corporation to be convicted of
an offence physically committed by any of its employees or agents, even if
the individual wrongdoer is a low-level employee with very little authority.
Other courts in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have
taken a narrower approach by developing the "Identification Theory,"
according to which a corporation will only be convicted of a crime when the
criminal behavior was carried out by individuals who are the 'directing
minds' of the corporation.
1 6
Criminal Code offences generally have higher mens rea
requirements than regulatory offences. The Supreme Court of Canada held
in 1978 that there are three types of statutory offences, for v,,hich different
Pronunciations, 3d ed., (San Francisco: Bancroft-\W'hitney. 1969) sx. corporation'.
14 In R. v. lane Robinson Ltd., [1941] 3 D.LR, 409 at 413 (Alta. S.C- (A.D.)), Mr. Justice Ford
wrote, "I find it difficult to see why a corporation %,hich can enter into binding agreements v-sth
individuals and other corporations cannot be ,aid to entertain mcns rca %, hcn it enters into an
agreement which is the gist of conspiracy, and if by its cororate act it can make a false pretense
involving it in liability to pay damages for deceit %- hy it cannot be said to hae the eapacity to make a
representation involving criminal responsibility."
15 Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co. ct aL, 275 N.E. 2d 33 at paras. 49-50 (D. Mas.. 1971),
cer. denied, 407 U.S. 910, and ceat. denied, 407 U.S. 914 (1972). endoL-rs the respandcat ,iupcnor
doctrine. Mister Justice Spiegel held: "[Wle are of [the] opinion that the quantum of proof nece:ar)y
to sustain the conviction of a corporation for the acts of its agents is sufficiently met if it is Fhc;.,n that
the corporation has placed the agent in a position %,.here he has enough authonty and rerpan.ibility to
act for and on behalf of the corporation in handling the rarticular corporate busmes:, oparation or
project in which he was engaged at the time he committed the criminal act." See also K. Brickey,
"Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code" (19Z3) 19 Rutgers L. 593.
16British and Canadian courts have expresslyavodcd findingcriminal liability throughrcsPndcat
superior. See R. v. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. Ltd. (195). 19 C.C.C ( 3d) 1 (S.C.C.) Mtster Justice
Estey delivered the judgment of the Court, and summanzed the la-: "[Tlhc courts in this country can
be said to this date to have declined generally to apply the principle of respondeat su,.-nar in the
determination of corporate criminal responsibility. Criminal responsibility in our courts thus far has
been achieved in the mens rea offences by the attribution to the corporation of the acts of its empl5 ecs
and agents on the more limited basis of the doctrine of the directing mind or identification"
20011
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levels of mens rea apply.17 First, most Criminal Code offences are mens rea
offences--offences for which the prosecution must prove both the act and
an intention to commit the act beyond a reasonable doubt. The act must
have been done "knowingly," "with intent," or "willfully." Second, most
regulatory offences are, on the other hand, strict liability
offences-offences for which the prosecution must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the act was committed and for which the accused can
rely on a due diligence defence. Finally, some regulatory offences (but no
Criminal Code offences) are absolute liability offences-offences for which
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was
committed by the accused, and for which the due diligence defence is
unavailable to the accused. The Supreme Court has held that absolute
liability offences are unconstitutional if they have the potential to deprive
a person of his/her section 7 Charter rights to life, liberty, or security of the
person."8 Thus, an offence cannot carry absolute liability if a prison
sentence is a possibility. To the contrary, offences that carry the possibility
of imprisonment must include a mens rea element and must afford the
accused a defence of due diligence.' 9
IV. OPTIMAL SANCTIONS FOR THE CRIMINAL
CORPORATION
The doctrinal complexities of obtaining a criminal conviction aside,
sentencing a convicted corporation is tremendously challenging. It is
impossible to imprison a corporation."0 Corporations that are convicted of
17 v. Sault Ste. Marie (City), (197812 S.C.R. 1299.
18 Reference Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
19 v. Cancoil Thermal Corp. (1986), 52 C.R. (3d) 188 (Ont. C.A.).
20 However, in United States v.Allegheny Bottling Co. 695 F. Supp. 856 at 859 (E.D. Va. 1988), afrd,
870 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1989), the Court sentenced Allegheny Pepsi (convicted of price-fixing with Mid-
Atlantic Coca-Cola) to three years "imprisonment" in addition to a fine of one million dollars. In this
case, corporate imprisonment entailed the Court supervising the company and limiting its decision-
making authority. In particular, the company was not allowed to dispose of any of its franchises, capital
assets, or plants and facilities in the Norfolk, Richmond, and Baltimore areas without specific
permission of the Court. Mister Justice Doumar recognized that "this [wasI a novel holding" and
acknowledged that "it appears to run contrary to some authority." The sentence imposed on Allegheny
is better viewed as a probation order. The Criminal Code authorizes the use of probation orders for
individuals and corporations. However, statistics from Statistics Canada, Centre for Justice Statistics
reveal that no probation orders were made against convicted corporations in 1998-1999 or 1999-2000.
Criminal corporations have been sentenced to the death penalty in the United States. See Standard
Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); State ex rel Hadley v. Delmar Jockey Club, 200 Mo. 24, 92 S.W.
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criminal or quasi-criminal offences are generally fined. An obvious
challenge lies in determining the optimal fine for a criminal corporation.
To analyze the issue of optimal sanctions, one needs a model of
criminal behaviour to assess why the offender committed the offence. The
model that I use for this analysis is of an entity that engages in a rational,
cost-benefit analysis before engaging in any conduct, prohibited or
otherwise." The entity only engages in criminal misconduct where the
expected benefits (the gains from the misconduct) exceed the expected
costs (the actual fine, legal defence costs, bad publicity, stigma, and loss of
reputation, etc.). Where the expected costs are less than the expected
benefits, the offender All engage in the prohibited activity. Thus, from a
deterrence perspective, the state should attempt to set the expected costs,
and in particular the expected sentence, at an amount at least equal to the
expected benefit to the offender.
This model of criminal misconduct is quite unrealisticin the context
of individuals who commit blue-collar crimes. 2 Such individuals may
commit blue-collar crimes for a myriad of economic, social, and political
reasons. Increasing the expected cost of the activity by increasing the
sanction will not necessarily deter such individuals. A legitimate concern
raised by academics is thai mandatory minimum sentences do not have the
desired effect of deterring individuals from engaging in relevant
misconduct. To conclude that mandatory minimum sentences deter
individuals would require us to assume that individuals are aware of
changes in sentencing, and that they engage in a rational cost-benefit
analysis before acting-assumptions that are questionable at best.
However, the inability of mandatory minimum sentences to deter
prohibited conduct by natural persons does not automatically suggest that
mandatory minimum fines will not deter corporations from engaging in
misconduct.
185 (1905); Model Penal Code s.6.04(2) (1962) (Proposed Official Draft). The US, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines also authorize a death penalty for criminal corporations. See United States Sentencing
Commission, Guidelines Manual 7 (1 November 1992), s.SCI.1.
21 For greater detail on an economic analysis of criminal lav.,, see 0.S. Becker, "Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76 J. Pol, Econ. 169. See also G.S. Becker & G. Stigler,
"Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers" (1974) 3 ., Legal Stud. 1.
221 define "blue-collar crime" to consist of crimescommitted by individualsof lewsaem-ccononmc
statuswho commitwhat societygenerally regards as traditional criminal offencessuch astheft, robb e ,
assault, sexual assault, and murder. The term is contrasted v%,ith "v,.hite-collar crime." hich I define
as economic crimes committed by business enterprises or persons of higher seio-economic status.
20011
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In fact, the rational economic actor model outlined above is a quite
realistic model of corporate criminal behaviour. By definition, corporations
are in the business of making profits. They act rationally, and engage in
criminal misconduct when the expected benefits of the misconduct exceed
its expected costs. Corporations would go out of business if the expected
costs of their activities regularly exceeded the expected benefits.
Corporations are also more attuned than individuals to changes in
substantive laws and sentencing. The largest corporations in Canada have
regulatory and compliance departments that monitor changes in the law,
and recommend adjustments to corporate activity accordingly. Because
corporations respond to such economic incentives, deterrence should be the
prime goal in sentencing criminal corporations. Thus, to deter corporate
misconduct effectively, the fine (the expected cost) should be set, at a
minimum, at an amount equal to the expected profit or loss resulting from
the misconduct (the expected benefit). A fine set at an amount less than the
expected benefit would not deter the corporate offender; it would reduce
the gains from engaging in the misconduct rather than eliminating them,
thereby still making it profitable for the corporation to engage in the
misconduct (albeit less so).
Below is an example that illustrates optimal sentencing based on
this model. Company A dumps chemicals into a lake in violation of an
environmental protection statute rather than spending $10,000 to dispose
of the chemicals in accordance with the legislation. Company A thereby
gains $10,000. If convicted, Company A should have to pay a minimum fine
of $10,000. A fine of any amount less than $10,000 would reduce the profit
realized by Company A, but an incentive to violate the statute would
remain.
The above analysis assumes perfect detection and enforcement so
that all misconduct is caught-an unrealistic assumption. Given limited
public resources, only a small percentage of misconduct is actually detected
and prosecuted. As such, the minimum fine should be inversely
proportional to the likelihood of detection. If we assume that only 25 per
cent of misconduct is detected (such that only one in every four violations
of the environmental statute is caught) then the mandatory minimum fine
should be set at $40,000-the profit gained by the violation multiplied by
four (the inverse of the probability of being caught). A fine set at a lower
amount would result in inadequate deterrence and Company A would
continue to engage in the misconduct because doing so would result in a net
expected benefit. For example, if the fine was set at $10,000, and Company
A committed four violations (only one of which was detected), the expected
benefit to Company A would be $40,000, but the expected cost would only
Sentencing the Criminal Corporation
be the fine of $10,000, resulting in a net expected benefit of $30,000. Thus,
it would remain profitable for Company A to engage in the misconduct.
Even though an optimal fine can be achieved through very low
enforcement and very high penalties, at some level, principles of fairness
and equity would come into play and prevent the imposition of extremely
high penalties. For example, if 0.10 per cent of misconduct was detected
(one in every thousand acts of prohibited dumping was caught), then even
though a fine of $10,000,000 ($10,000 x 1000) would be economically
sound, it may be unfair to impose such a high fine on an offender.
The next section surveys existing sentences for Criminal Code and
selected regulatory offences and evaluates them against the model for
optimal sanctions set out above.
V. SURVEY OF EXISTING SENTENCES FOR CRIMINAL
CORPORATIONS
Of the twenty-nine offences in the Ciminal Code that carry
mandatory minimum sentences, almost all of them involve crimes of
violence or crimes resulting in physical injury to others.24 Very few of the
offences that carry mandatory minimum sentences involve crimes that
corporations are even capable of committing, and even if corporations
could, in theory, commit such crimes, they have not historically been
charged with doing so.
However, mandatory minimumjail sentences are meaningless in the
context of the criminal corporation because corporations cannot be
imprisoned. Section 735 of the Criminal Code provides that a judge may
impose a fine upon a corporation in lieu of imprisonment up to a maximum
of $25,000 for a summary offence, and in an amount in the court's
discretion for an indictable offence.2 As a result, any mandatory minimum
zq The principle of proportionality in section 718.1 of the Crimuzal Ce,,e, rupra note 5, s° 7181,
reflects this economic concept. The section reads: "a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of
the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender."
24 N. Crutcher, "The Legislative History of Mandatory Minimum Penalties of Imprisonment in
Canada" (2001) 39 Osgoode Hall I-J. 273.
25 Supra note 5, s. 735(1). Section 735(l) reads: "A corporation that is con'.icted of an offence is
liable, in lieu of any imprisonment that is prescribed as punishment for that offence, to be fined in an
amount, except where otherwise provided by law.
(a) that is in the discretion of the court, w.here the offence is an indictable offence; or
(b) not exceeding tventy-fi~e thousand dollars. x-here the offence is a summary convctton
offence."
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sentence set out in the Criminal Code becomes, when the accused is a
corporation, a discretionary sentence determined by the judge.
The Criminal Code, however, is not the only source of statutory
offences that corporations are capable of committing. While the other
articles in this issue focus on mandatory minima in the Criminal Code,
corporations also potentially face liability under regulatory statutes such as
the Ontario Securities Act, 6 the Competition Act, the Income Tax Act, the
Canada Business Corporations Act,27 the Ontario Business Corporations
Act,78 health and safety legislation, and environmental protection statutes,
as noted above.
An unsurprising conclusion emerges from a review of these statutes:
most of the offences in these statutes are silent on the issue of sentencing,
leaving it entirely within the discretion of the court. While a number of the
offences specify a maximum sentence, only rarely does a mandatory
minimum fine accompany an offence.
Table 1 in the Appendix sets out penalties for offences under the
Ontario Securities Act. Under the Ontario Securities Act, the only offence
that carries a mandatory minimum fine is insider trading. The penalty for
trading with the knowledge of a material fact or change that has not been
generally disclosed is a minimum of the profit made or loss avoided but a
maximum of the greater of one million dollars or triple the profit made or
loss avoided. A minimum penalty of the profit made suggests perfect
detection and enforcement, which is certainly not the case. Even if the
minimum penalty was set at three times the profit made, this would imply
that one-third of violations are caught. This is highly unlikely. In fact, the
Ontario Securities Commission detects a much smaller proportion of
insider trading violations.29
Table 2 in the Appendix sets out sentences for various offences
under the Income TaxAct. The Income TaxAct has a number of mandatory
minimum sentences. A number of offences carry a minimum fine of $1000.
If a corporation is charged with evading taxes as a summary offence, the
mandatory minimum fine is one half of the tax evaded, but a maximum fine
equal to the tax evaded in also in place. If the corporation is charged with
evading taxes as an indictable offence, the fine is, at a minimum, equal to
26 R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5 [hereinafter Ontario Securities Act].
27 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
2 8 R.S.O. 1990, c. B-16 (hereinafter Ontario Business Corporations Act].
2 9 T. Tedesco, "When a Watchdog Becomes a Pit Bull: Bay Street Wants Regulator Brought to
Heel" National Post (25 November 2000) D1.
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the tax evaded, and at a maximum, double the tax evaded. Unless
enforcement of summary conviction tax offences is such that for every one
evader, two taxpayers are caught (one wrongfully), then the mandatory
minimum fine for summary offence tax evasion is too low from an
economic perspective. Similarly, unless detection and enforcement of
indictable tax offences is perfect, such that all offenders are caught,
mandatory minimum fines are too low.
Table 3 sets out the sentences for various offences under the
Competition Act. An extraordinary number of offences carry maximum
sentences but the Competition Act is silent on mandatory minimum
sentences. Tables 4 and 5 set out sentences for various offences under the
Canada Business Corporations Act and the Ontario Business Corporations
Act respectively. While there are fewer offences in the corporate law
statutes than in the other regulatory statutes, the offences that exist do not
have mandatory minimum fines but do carry maximum penalties.
In summary, this survey of the Criminal Code and selected
regulatory statutes leads one to the conclusion that there is significant room
for sentencing reform because sentences set out in these statutes are much
lower than optimal sentences, based on an economic theory of corporate
criminal behavior.
Although the mandatory minimum fines set out in statutes are often
not optimal, there would be little cause for concern if judges imposed fines
at optimal levels when sentencing criminal corporations. This article
conducts a survey of actual sentences imposed by judges in Canada for
wrongdoing by criminal corporations, and also reviews the existing
literature that has found that significant disparities exist in conviction rates
and sentencing between white-collar criminals and blue-collar criminals.
Existing studies reveal that white-collar criminal offenders are sentenced
more leniently than blue-collar offenders. In 1991 and 1992, in Canada,
only 4 per cent of people convicted of tax evasion under section 239 of the
Income TaxAct were sentenced to imprisonment, but 9 per cent of people
convicted of fraud under section 103 of the Unenplqvment Insurance Act
were sentenced to imprisonment." Laureen Snider's seminal study also
revealed that sanctions for blue-collar theft were much heavier than those
for corporate theft."' In comparing traditional theft to misleading
R.S.C. 1985, c. U-1, as rep. by S.C. 1996, c. Z3, s, 155. See also D D Graham Reynolds,
"Observations on Sentencing in 'White Collar' and 'Blue C llare Fraud Cavs' (Federal Prkiecutor'
Conference, Toronto, August 1994) [unpublished).
3
Snider, supra note 9.
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advertising from 1970 to 1972, Snider found that approximately fifty-seven
thousand theft cases were prosecuted. On the other hand, only 126
misleading advertising cases were prosecuted. She found that of the 99
individuals or entities convicted of misleading advertising, the average fine
per case was only $470.33. Statistics from the United States also reveal
significant disparities between robbery, burglary, and larceny, on the one
hand, and fraud, tax law violations, and embezzlement, on the other, with
respect to the proportion of individuals sentenced to prison, average
sentence given, and average time served.32
Statistics for the years 1998-99 and 1999-2000 on conviction rates
for selected federal offences that individuals and corporations are capable
of committing are set out in Tables 6-1, 6-2, 7-1, and 7-2 in the Appendix.
As a general matter, conviction rates for corporations are lower than for
individuals. For example, the conviction rate for Criminal Code offences in
Canada in 1999-2000 was 59.8 per cent for individuals but 41.6 per cent for
corporations (Table 6-1). This disparity can be attributed to a number of
possible factors, two of which are that corporations generally have greater
economic resources to defend criminal charges than individuals and that it
may be more difficult to prove the elements of the offence against a
criminal corporation. An exception to this general conclusion is found in
the conviction rates for the Canadian Environmental Protection Act33 for
which, in 1999-2000, 66.7 per cent of charged corporations were convicted
but only 25 per cent of individuals (Table 6-1).
Statistics for the years 1998-99 and 1999-2000 on the level of fines
imposed by judges on corporations and individuals convicted of selected
federal offences are set out in Tables 8-1, 8-2, 9-1, and 9-2 in the Appendix.
As a general matter, the mean and the median fines for corporations
($7948 and $1000 respectively) are much higher than the mean and the
median fines for individuals ($671 and $300 respectively). It is significant
to note, however, that the largest fines under each statute were almost
always imposed on individuals rather than on corporations. For example,
the largest fine imposed on a corporation under the Criminal Code in
1999-2000 was $175,000 but the largest fine imposed on an individual was
over $3,000,000 (Table 8-1).
However, the Centre for Justice Statistics at Statistics Canada does
not collect dollar measures of the harm caused or profit gained by
32 J. Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and CriminalJustice, 6 h
ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2001) at Table 3-2.
33 S.C. 1999, c. 33.
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offenders. Thus, without any measure of the harm caused, it is difficult to
interpret the significance of the finding that corporations receive, on
average, higher fines than individuals.
Courts also have the authority to require individuals and
corporations to make restitution for misconduct. Tables 10-1, 10-2, 11-1,
and 11-2 set out restitution awards imposed on corporations and individuals
convicted of selected federal offences. It is possible to interpret the
restitution award by a court as an indirect indicator of the harm caused or
profit gained by an offender engaging in misconduct. The problem with this
approach is that courts often do not order corporations to make restitution,
possibly because the victim of corporate crime is often not clearly
identifiable. In 1998-99, only one corporation was ordered to make
restitution (in the amount of $6500- Table 10-1). In 1999-2000, two orders
of restitution were ordered against convicted corporations (Table 10-2).
While the sentencing literature and statistics provide a macro-
analysis of sentencing, in some cases courts have applied what would be
considered optimal sentencing policy in setting sentences for criminal
corporations. In R. v. McNamara et a ," a highly publicized case which
involved collusive biddingpractices in the dredging industry, the Court held
that in sentencing the criminal corporations it was proper to consider the
difference between the actual contract price obtained through collusion and
the competitive price. In addressing the corporations' argument that on
some occasions collusion did not result in the anticipated profit, the Court
held that it was proper to consider the expected profits as a reference point.
The Court also noted that the fines imposed should be effective as a
general deterrent and therefore should be substantial without being
crippling or vindictive.
However, in . x Hoffinann-La Roche Ltd. (,,o. 2)," another case
brought before the Ontario courts in the early 1980s involving the
sentencing of a transnational pharmaceutical corporation convicted of
predatory pricing, Mr. Justice Linden refused to impose a fine equivalent
to the long-term profit the company hoped to earn from the illegal activity.
He noted:
In this case, the Crown urges for a vey sc ere pcnalty on the ground that predatory pricing
must be prevented. He points out that the defendant corporation is a successful one vath
powxerful international support and that a large fine is necessary"to hate a deterrent effect
on the conduct of a multi-million dollar corporation:' A small fine, he argued, v%,ould b-
34 (19S1), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 516 (Ont. C.A.).
35 (19S0), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 563 (Ont. H.CJ.).
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tantamount to a licence fee for illegal activity. He asked the Court to arrive at a figure similar
to the cost to the company of engaging in its illegal activity and related to the potential long-
term profits it hoped to earn from this activity. One million dollars, he felt, would be
appropriate.'
Nonetheless, Mr. Justice Linden held that the appropriate fine for
the defendant corporation was $50,000 on the basis that the criminal
conduct harmed no one but the corporation itself; the scheme backfired
and it cost the corporation approximately one million dollars. Additionally,
in assessing the role of general deterrence in sentencing, Mr. Justice Linden
noted that "[ijf a crime is prevalent, more serious penalties may be required
to help reduce its incidence." 37 Because there have been very few
prosecutions for predatory pricing in Canada since the enactment of the
offence and because this case resulted in the first conviction in Canada for
predatory pricing, he concluded that "there seems little public need for a
severe penalty in this case to serve as an example to others about to engage
in similar criminal activity, because there do not seem to be many such
others poised." 8 He clearly did not take into account the fact that
enforcement levels do not equal the actual incidence of misconduct.
These cases suggest that for every judge who attempts to set fines
according to optimal sentencing policy, there are many others who do not.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though mandatory minimum sentences have been on the rise
in Canada, Part V has demonstrated that very few crimes and/or regulatory
offences that can be committed by corporations carry mandatory minimum
sentences; where minimum fines do exist, they are set at such low levels that
effective deterrence is not achieved. There is certainly a need for legislating
higher mandatory minimum sentences where they currently exist and for
creating mandatory minimum fines where they do not exist.
This article has focused on analyzing optimal sentencing strategies
for criminal corporations. It has not addressed the issue of the political will
necessary to implement such proposals. While the proposal to mandate
fines at a minimum of the profit gained or loss caused is sound from an
economic perspective, it is unlikely to be a priority on the political agenda.
A movement towards enacting mandatory minimum sentences for
3 6 Ibi. at 565.
37 Ib. at 566.
3 8 Ibi.
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corporate crimes will likely face apprehension from political leaders given
public complacency regarding reform of laws governing corporate conduct.
Violent crimes such as robbery or breaking and entering (that may
or may not have an economic impact) are regarded as more harmful than
economic crimes such as lessening competition, misleading advertising, and
misrepresentation in securities markets that are generally committed by
corporations. Offences committed by corporations are often complex and
difficult to translate into actual harm for those in the general voting public
and, thus, are not at the top of the political agenda. Politicians do not or are
unvlling to understand the harms caused by corporate misconduct.
There is also a lack of real political pressure to implement or
increase mandatory minimum sentences for corporate criminals.
Corporations wvill certainly not lobby for them. Victims of corporate crime
often may not know that they have been harmed, each victim may have
been harmed in a relatively minor way even though the aggregate harm
caused to all victims is large, or victims may not be clearly identifiable. This
means that there are few people or interest groups who are villing to speak
out and lobby for higher sentences for corporate criminals. Corporations
also have the financial means to counter such lobbying efforts. Nonetheless,
recent events in Seattle and Quebec City suggest that the public can be
made more aware of corporate misconduct and that public attitudes toward
corporate crime can be changed, which may ultimately spur politicians into
action. The momentum from the current political interest in mandatory
minimum sentences in the context of violent crimes can also be usefully
appropriated in makdng the case for mandatory minimum fines for criminal
corporations.
APPENDIX
Table 1: Sentences for Selected Offences under the Ontario SccuritiesAct. 2600
SECrnON OFFENCE PENALTY
122(1) Making of a statement that is 52 years andfor S1 million
misleading or untrue to investigators
appointed under this Act or in a
document required under securities law
or that contravenes securities law
122(3) Authorization of the commission of an :2 years andlor :S1 million
offence under subsection 122(1)
122(4) Contravention of section 76 (trading profit made or loss prevented
with the knowledge of a material fact or by reason of the contravention &
change that has not been generally e the greater of: a) $I million;
disclosed) and b) an amount equal to triple
the profit made or loss avoided
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Failure to file or make a return when
required or failure to comply with ss.
116(3), notice to minister upon disposal
of property; 127(3.1), issuance of a
receipt for political contribution;
127(3.2), deposit of amounts
contributed to political candidates;
147.1(7), obligations of administrator of
a registered pension plan; 153(1),
obligation to withhold funds and remit
to the receiver general; 230, obligation
to keep records & books by those
required to collect & pay taxes; 231,
provisions for audits/inspections; 232,
solicitor-client privilege claims; a
regulation under subsection 147.1(18);
or an order under subsection 238(2),
order for compliance with a provision
violated
PENALTY
$1000-$25,000; or both the fine
and < 1 year, in addition to any
penalty otherwise provided
239(1) & Making or allowing for deceptive In addition to any penalty
(2) statements to be made un relation otherwise provided:
requirements under this act; (summary) 50-200 per cent, of
destroyinglaltering records for the the amount of tax sought to be
purpose of evading payment tax; wilfully evaded; or both the fine and <2
evading, conspiring, or attempting to years
evade compliance with the Act (indictment) 100-200 per cent,
of the amount of tax sought to be
evaded; or both the fine and 5
years
239(1.1) Obtaining a refund or credit s/he not In addition to any penalty
& (2) entitled to by making or allowing for otherwise provided:
false statements, destroying/altering (summary) 50-200 per cent, of
records, or wilfully or conspiring to the amount of refund or credit
commit an offence under this not entitled to; or both the fine
subsection and <2 years
(indictment) 100-200 per cent,
of the amount of refund or credit
not entitled to; or both the fine
and 5 years
239(2.1) Providing an incorrect tax shelter 100-200 per cent of the cost to
identification number the other person of that person's
interest in the shelter and/or 2
years
i i
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SECTION OFFENCE PENALTY
239(2.2) Contravention of subsection 241(1) or z$f5 UWU andor 1 year
knowingly contravening subsection
241(4.1) (release of confidential
taxpayer information)
239(2.21) Knowingly using or allowing the use of $5 GUU and!or I year
tax-payer information the has been
provided to an official or for a specified
purpose
239(2.3) Unauthorized use or communication of $S5 UUU and(or 1 year
a social insurance number provided
under this act
Table 3: Sentences for Selected Offences under the Cempetition Act, 2001
SECTION OFFENCE PENALTY
45(1) Conspiracy to unduly inhibit ::,5 years andlor ' SIO million
competition
46(1) Corporation following the Fine in the discretion of the court
directive of a foreign parent
corporation to commit what
would have been a section 45
violation
47(1) Being party to a bid-rigging 5 years andfor fine in the
discretion of the court
48(1) Conspiracy to unreasonably '5 years andfor tine in the
inhibit participation or discretion of the court
negotiation to play professional
sport
49(1) Rate agreements between federal :5 years and!or :S1U million
financial institutions
50(1) Engaging in illegal trade practices 2years
51(1) Granting an allowance, not on t2years
proportionate terms
52(5) Making false or misleading Indictment: :S5 years andfor tine in
representations the discretion of the court
Summary: : Iear andfor
___O_200000
52.1(9) Failure to make proper Indictment: -5 years andfor fine in
disclosures or engaging in the discretion of the court
deceptive telemarketing practices Summary: i 1 year andfor
<S200.000
54(2) Double-ticketing - selling a -I year andlor tS10AJUtJ
product at a price that exceeds the
lowest of those expressed
20011
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SECTION OFFENCE PENALTY
55(3) Making misrepresentations with Indictment: 5 years and/or fine in
regard to compensation for the discretion of the court
participation in a multi-level Summary: 1 year and/or
marketing plan : $200,000
55.1(3) Establishment, operation, or Indictment: <5 years and/or fine in
promotion of a pyramid selling the discretion of the court
scheme Summary: < 1 year and/or
:g $200,000
61(9) Supplier using coercion to 5 years and/or fine in the
maintain a selling price/refusal to discretion of the court
supply a product because of the
low pricing policy of that person
65(1) Failure to comply with an order 2 years and/or $5000
under section 11 (order for oral
examination, production or
written return) or contravention
of section 15(5) (duty of person in
control of premises to abide by
warrant) or 16(2) (duty of person
in control of computer system to
abide by warrant)
65(2) Contravention of sections 114 or :5$50,000
123
65(3) Destruction or alteration of Indictment: 5 years and/or
records or things as required to be $50,000
produced under section 11 (order Summary: -2 years and/or
for oral examination, production 5$25,000
or written return) or under a
warrant issued under section 15
66 Contravention of an order made Indictment: ,5 years and/or fine in
under Part VII.1 (deceptive the discretion of the court
market practices) or VIII (matters Summary: 51 year and/or $25,000
reviewable by tribunal - refusal to
deal; exclusive dealing, tied selling
& market restriction; abuse of
dominant position; delivered
pricing; foreign judgments & laws;
foreign suppliers; specialization
agreements- mergers)
Table 4: Sentences for offences under the Canada Business CorporationsAct, 2000/2001
SECTION OFFENCE PENALTY
250(1) Making an untrue statement or $5,000 and/or 6 months
omitting to state a material fact in a
report ______ _____and/or _6_months
250(2) Director or officer knowingly 55,000 and/or 6 months
allowing a subsection 250(1) offence
to occur
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Table 5: Sentences for Offences under the Ontario Business ComorationsAct. 216012631
SECTION OFFNCE PENALTY
256(2) Misrepresentation in a document eS2UUU andtor 1 ar; or if a body
required under this Act; failure to corporate: -S25,0
file requisite documents; failure to
comply with requirements under this
Act.
256(3) Director or officer knowingly :S2UUU andor 1 year
allowing a subsection 256(2) offence
to occur
Failure to comply with section 29(5),
prohibited transfer of shares;
Use of a securities holder list in
contravention of section 52(5), list
of registered holders of debt
obligations or section 146(8), list of
shareholders
Failure to send necessary proxies in
contravention of section 111,
mandatory solicitation of proxy;
Failure to send information circular
in connection with a proxy
solicitation in contravention of
section 112(1), proper distribution
of information circular;,
Failure to comply with directions of
the shareholder who appointed
himlher in contravention of section
114(1), obligation of a proxy holder
to attend & comply with directions-
Contravention of section 145,
examination of records by
shareholders and creditors;
Failure by a director to appoint an
auditor as required under section
149(1);
Failure by an auditor to comply v, ith
a section 151(2) request to attend
the shareholders meeting;
Failure to comply with section
154(1), information required to be
provided before the annual
shareholders meeting;
Acting contrary to or failure to
comply with the provisions of the
Act
,$2UUU andor 1 year; or ifa budy
corporate: $n.S25,UOt
256(1)
258(2) Director or officer knowingly S2U - J andfor 1 year
allowing a subsection 258(1) offence
to occur
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